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SHELDON WEIN
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ABSTRACT: Many of the problems we face can usefully be modeled as prisoners’ dilemmas. All the
standard game-theoretic solutions to prisoners’ dilemmas lead, in the real world, to assurance games. But
too often some aspects of our social interaction are as much obscured by, as illuminated by, game theory.
Removing some of the epistemic constraints often accepted by game theorists will enable us to distinguish
between productive and destructive prisoners’ dilemmas. Doing so is an important step in understanding
the nature of some of our social problems.
KEYWORDS: Assurance games, decision theory, Hobbes, prisoners’ dilemmas, public goods, Rousseau.

1. INTRODUCTION
Though the fact that strategic choice can lead to sub-optimal outcomes has been appreciated for some time—at least since the work of Hobbes, Hume, and Rousseau—it was only during the Twentieth Century that we finally developed a clear and precise gametheoretic way to model both the prisoners’ dilemma and assurance games. These models
were developed during a period when both minimalist assumptions and mathematical rigor were—properly, in my view—highly valued. Thus our accounts of both the prisoners’ dilemma and assurance games are standardly represented using only ordinal utility
scales, and a background assumption is that interpersonal utility comparisons are not possible. For most purposes this ontological economy serves us extremely well. It has enabled theorists to represent the most important points in a manner that is simple without
being simplistic, and it has allowed for many more people to understand extremely complex features of various coordination problems faced by contemporary societies than otherwise would be possible. (In this regard, the development of game theory with only ordinal utility scales and no interpersonal comparisons is similar to moving from the roman
numeral system to Arabic numerals: suddenly almost everyone (regardless of their competence in mathematics) could understand a lot more than they could prior to that development. And just as we are not required to use game-theoretic models to explain strategic
choice (neither Hobbes nor Rousseau had the benefit of game theory to help them), there
is nothing in mathematics that requires the use of the Arabic number system. But we all
know that, in both cases, all of us—those of us with ordinary levels of talent and mathematical geniuses—are able in fact to see much more than we otherwise could.) Such parsimony has been beneficial both to theorists and to practitioners—those who seek to find
practical solutions, or find ways of implementing proposals the theoreticians have developed—and has allowed them a better chance of understanding the true nature of some of
the problems we as a species deal with when trying to coordinate our interactions. So, on
Zenker, F. (ed.). Argumentation: Cognition and Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18-21, 2011. Windsor, ON (CD ROM), pp. 1-12.
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the whole (even if we set aside the ontological and epistemic arguments against cardinal
utility scales and interpersonal comparisons of utility), the fact that we have shunned
them has been extremely beneficial. (For an opposing view by a leader in the field, see
Sen (2009), especially Chapter 8.)
But, as with most things, these benefits come with costs. In this paper I will explore how slightly enriching the game-theoretic understanding of prisoners’ dilemmas
and assurance games is significant in planning to avoid assurance dampers and which
sorts of assurance amplifiers we should seek in various situations. In this case, the enriched games amount to no more than what we all absorbed when we learned about prisoners’ dilemmas and assurance games. In particular, I will argue that we need to distinguish between what I will call productive prisoners’ dilemmas and destructive prisoners’
dilemmas.1
2. PRISONERS’ DILEMMAS AND ASSURANCE GAMES
Prisoners’ dilemmas and assurance games are defined in terms of the preferences of the
participants. A prisoners’ dilemma is a game where the players’ preferences are these
(from most preferred to least preferred): lone defection, mutual cooperation, mutual defection, and (worst of all) lone cooperation. An assurance game is any game where, for
each participant, mutual cooperation is the best outcome and lone cooperation is the
worst outcome. 2 Given these definitions, only ordinal utility scales are needed, and there
is no assumption (indeed, there is usually the denial) that interpersonal comparisons of
utility are possible.
In one sense this parsimony is to be expected. Why rely on assumptions regarding more extensive information than is needed when such assumptions face both epistemic and ontological challenges? But, looked at another way, the parsimony is surprising.
After all, the original stories that virtually everyone uses to learn about the prisoners’ dilemma and the assurance game (implicitly, at least) assume both cardinal utility scales
and that interpersonal comparisons over the outcomes are possible. The story from which
the prisoners’ dilemma gets its name always has payoffs put in terms of something quite
objective, time in jail. Admittedly, we are told only that the players prefer less time in jail
to longer periods in jail, so strictly speaking we are not told how much one prefers, say, 1
year in jail to 10 years. However, we all tend to make implicit assumptions. (And, in my
quick unscientific look through the literature the defect/defect option was always the collectively worst outcome. Of course, on reflection we might think that there is diminishing
marginal disutility to time in jail and that we cannot make exact comparisons of how
much Row and Column value freedom. But, for the purposes of what we are learning—
that individual rationality leads to a Pareto sub-optimal outcome—I suspect almost everyone assumes that defect/defect is the collectively worst outcome. But doing that is,
strictly speaking, not allowed.) The same is true of assurance games—although, given
1

2

For reasons that will become clear, I am going to refer to these as PPDs and DPDs. Since selecting
strategies for iterated prisoners’ dilemma games is not itself a prisoners’ dilemma problem, I will confine myself in this paper to one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas. Of course, one way to (dis)solve an apparent
prisoners’ dilemma is show the parties that it is part of an iterated series of such interactions.
I will not be concerned with whether the participants are indifferent between the remaining two outcomes or if one is preferred to the other.
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that few of us have either venison or rabbit as a regular part of our diets, Rousseau’s story
of the stag hunters does not carry for us, as it did for his contemporary readers, the same
sense of just how special eating deer meat is. But Rousseau is, nonetheless, able to indicate that had his hunters been able to kill the deer their reward would have been—both
collectively and individually—quite great. Indeed, his point seems to be that despite the
enormous payoff of killing the deer the hunters will not be able to achieve this result.
3. ORIGINAL STORIES
3.1 The prisoners’ dilemma
The prisoners’ dilemma derives its name from the following story. Row and Column
have been accused of a crime. They have agreed with each other not to confess to the
crime. But the prosecuting attorney tells Row that if she confesses to the crime and Column remains silent, Row will get off. If both confess, both will go to jail for a medium
length of time. If both remain silent, both will go to jail for a short time. Of course, since
the prosecutor is offering the same deal to Column as she is offering to Row, if Row remains
silent and Column confesses, then Row will go to jail for a long time and Column will get
off. Row must decide whether she should cooperate with Column and remain silent, or
whether she should defect and confess to the prosecutor. Column also faces this choice. 3
It would seem that it is most rational for Row to defect from her arrangement
with Column and confess to the prosecutor, for if Row defects, she is better off no matter
what Column does. That is, if Column defects, Row is better off defecting (she’ll get a
medium-length sentence) than she is cooperating (she will get a long sentence). And if
Column cooperates, Row is still better off defecting (she will get off with no time in jail)
than she is cooperating (she will get a short time in jail). The same is true for Column. So
if each wants to minimize her jail time, both should defect. But if both defect, both will
get a medium-length sentence in jail. If, instead, both cooperate, both only have to spend
a short time in jail. The dilemma is simply that by doing what appears to be the rational
thing for each to do in order to spend as little time as possible in jail, both will spend
more time in jail than if both had acted irrationally.
In the following matrix, the numbers represent the number of years in jail:

3

Typically, it is assumed that Row and Column are non-tuistic, that they take no interest in the other’s
interests. But this assumption is not essential. Even if Row and Column do care for each other—indeed
even if each loves the other to the exclusion of herself—they can find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma. On this see Wein (1985).
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Column
cooperate

defect

cooperate

1,1

7,0

defect

0,7

5,5

Row

Fig. 1. The prisoners’ dilemma in terms of years in jail
If Row wants to stay out of jail, she will defect. If Column wants to avoid jail, she will
defect. But if both defect, each spends longer in jail than if they had both cooperated.
Since the players are assumed to prefer less time to more time in jail we can display their
situation as follows:
Column
cooperate

defect

cooperate

2,2

4,1

defect

1,4

3,3

Row

Fig. 2. The prisoners’ dilemma in terms of the players’ preferences
3.2 The Assurance Game (or The Stag Hunt)
In Part II of his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau tells what has come to be known as
the stag hunt story. In Rousseau’s tale a group of hunters go out into the forest to hunt for
game. The hunters can cooperate and together hunt for a stag, surround it, kill it, and then
eat very well. Alternatively, each might hunt on his own and catch a few rabbits and
merely survive. The best outcome for each is that they all cooperate and kill the deer. But
if even one hunter abandons the cooperative stag hunt to catch rabbits, the stag will escape through the “hole” that the hunter who has gone after a rabbit has left in the “fence”.
It is rational for each to continue to cooperate in the stag hunt rather than to defect to hunt
for rabbits if, and only if, each hunter has adequate assurance that all others will also continue to cooperate. If any hunter lacks the assurance that all the others will continue to
cooperate in the stag hunt, then she should abandon the stage hunt and go chase rabbits.
This assurance that the other hunters will hunt the stag rather than chase a rabbit is something every hunter needs and which every hunter knows that every other hunter needs.
The best outcome for each is for joint cooperation resulting in lots of venison for
everyone. The next-best outcome is to hunt rabbits on one’s own regardless of what others do. The worst outcome is to continue the stag hunt when even one other hunter has
abandoned it to chase rabbits. Because it is rational to continue hunting for the stag only if
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one has adequate assurance that others will do so also, games with this structure have come
to be called assurance games. The matrices below display the standard assurance game:
Column
Row

cooperate
defect

cooperate
venison, venison
rabbit, nothing

defect
nothing, rabbit
rabbit, rabbit

Fig. 3. An assurance game in gastronomic terms
Since venison is preferred to rabbit and rabbit is preferred to nothing, we can represent
the outcomes as below:
Column

Row

cooperate
cooperate
best, best
defect
neither best nor worst,
worst

defect
worst, neither best nor worst
neither best nor worst,
neither best nor worst

Fig. 4. An assurance game in terms of the players’ preferences
3.3 Understanding Epistemic Impoverishment
Since game theorists typically assume only ordinal utility rankings and no interpersonal
comparisons of value, there are many things about the individuals we are discussing
which we do not know—indeed, cannot know. We cannot, for instance, say that Row
likes her best outcome compared with her second-best one a lot more than she prefers the
second-best outcome to her third-best outcome.4 Nor can we say that Row’s preferences
are stronger (or weaker) than Column’s when it comes to jail time. And we cannot say of
one hunter that she likes rabbit more than another does, nor that she only slightly prefers eating venison to eating rabbit but finds the difference between having some rabbit to eat and
going hungry to be enormous. It is not just that there are such facts and we happen not to
know them; it is assumed that no such facts exist, that there is nothing there to be known.5
4. “SOLVING” PRISONERS’ DILEMMAS
As I have argued elsewhere (Wein 2007b), every solution we have for escaping the suboptimal outcomes to which rationality moves us in prisoners’ dilemma games leads, in
the real world, to an assurance game. (To take just one example, if we follow Hobbes’s
recommendation and adopt an authority solution we are, in effect, hiring someone or an
institution to change the circumstances so that we are no longer in a prisoners’ dilemma
game. But whether the institution has sufficient support to warrant your support depends
4

Though, an important upside to accepting these epistemic constraints is that game theorists have developed extremely clever ways of reducing the impact of such constraints.
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This has led some, influenced by an overly constrained understanding of positivist theories of language,
to hold that such claims are not even meaningful.
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on whether enough others support or recognize the institution as an authority. Authorities
only have authority as long as enough people recognize them as having authority. But
then the question of whether to recognize a would-be authority as an actual authority is
for each person an assurance problem.) I have also argued that argumentation theorists
need to pay more attention to how to solve assurance games (Wein 2011).
When one surveys the literature on prisoners’ dilemmas, one finds numerous
proposed solutions. Hobbes tells us to use an authority solution. Gauthier (1986) says that
we should change our conception of rationality from being straightforward maximizers to
being constrained maximizers. MacIntosh (1992) tells us we should change our preferences, while Cave (1998) holds that we should cultivate the virtue of cooperation. Mintoff (2000) and Danielson (1992) think we should program ourselves to cooperate when
doing so is likely to be reciprocated. And there are many more.
Most theorists—certainly all those I have listed above—seem to believe that
their solution is the solution, that one size fits all. (I suspect, though I cannot argue for it
here, that this is at least partly because they have viewed prisoners’ dilemma games in the
impoverished way that game theory represents them.) But thinking that there is a single
solution to the problems that confront us because individual utility-maximizing rationality sometimes leads us to interact in sub-optimal ways is a huge mistake.
For most of human existence we did not get along very well, in part because we
had little in the way of tools to help us coordinate our interactions. But lately (between 10
to 20 millennia ago) we have developed a host of devices for creating and sustaining
larger societies: superstitions, and traditions, and complex emotions, and etiquette, and
religions, and moralities, and even legal systems. These enable us interact cooperatively
and, consequently, to live in groups much larger than was previously possible. And, subsequently, we have found ingenious ways to add substantial complexity to our traditions,
feelings, religions, morals, codes of etiquette, and legal systems so that many of us now
live in mega-cities each containing more humans than once roamed the entire planet.6
It is unlikely that one theoretical solution has spawned so many different practical
ways of dealing with the problem. This suggests that the coordination problems we face are
more varied and complex than is sometimes assumed. I now turn to distinguishing between
what I take to be the most important division among prisoners’ dilemma games.
5. PRODUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PRISONERS’ DILEMMAS
Since a prisoners’ dilemma is defined solely in terms of preferences over outcomes and
since I am going to describe situations where more is discussed than just preferences over
outcomes, I will adopt the following convention: a “prisoners’ dilemma” is any situation
where the players preferences are (from best to worst) lone defection, mutual cooperation, mutual defection, and lone cooperation. A “PD” is any situation where it is reasonable to suppose that the players would have preferences such that the PD is a prisoners’
6

I realize that these claims are extremely contentious. I have relied on Chapais (2008), Gat (2006), and
Pinker (2007). If the history of our species is radically different from what I am supposing, the relevance—but not, I believe, the validity—of my argument will be substantially altered. Thus, those who take
a Rousseauian view that the pre-history of humans was a time when noble savages lived in peace and harmony can use my arguments to help explain why game theory does not completely explain our collective
fall from grace. See Wein (2007a) for problems confronting new urbanites in the developing world.
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dilemma. Note that the original story from which we all learned about prisoners’ dilemmas
is a PD. We are not just told the players’ preferences; we are also told that these are based
on something—a desire to stay out of jail or, if jail be necessary, to spend as little time in
jail as possible. And, typically at least, we are given the length of each jail sentence.7
But if we think of jail time as something that can sensibly be agglomerated, we
can distinguish between two sorts of PDs our players might find themselves in. They
might be in a productive PD (or PPD) or in a destructive PD (or DPD). The difference is
this: In a PPD, mutual cooperation is the collectively best outcome, whereas in a DPD (at
least) one of either cooperate/defect or defect/cooperate is the collectively best outcome.
Thus if the arrangement that the prosecuting attorney offers the players is like that of Figure 5 below, they are in a PPD, but if it is like Figure 6, they are in a DPD:
Column
cooperate

defect

cooperate

1,1

3,0

defect

0,3

2,2

Row

Fig. 5. A productive PD (in terms of years in jail)
Column
cooperate

defect

cooperate

3,3

5,0

defect

0,5

4,4

Row

Fig. 6. A destructive PD (in terms of years in jail)
In the situation laid out in Figure 5, the collectively best outcome is mutual cooperation
(which yields collectively only 2 years in jail); hence 5 is a PPD. All other outcomes are
worse (yielding longer collective times in jail).
But the situation in 6 is a DPD; the collectively best outcomes are defect/cooperate and cooperate/defect. Each of these yields only 5 years in jail and all other
outcomes yield more time (6 years or 8 years).
Now, in fanciful cases like the ones above the distinction between PPDs and
DPDs might not seem important or especially interesting. But in more realistic cases it
can be very important. I turn to two such cases now.
7

In my quick unscientific survey of the literature every discussion of the original prisoners’ dilemma story was
told in such a way that if was a productive PD. There was not a single case of it being a destructive PD.
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First, imagine two islands named X and Y. Each island is populated with two
groups, the Rows and the Columns. (On both X and Y the Rows and the Columns have
strong tribal loyalties, so there are relatively few problems with cooperation among the
Rows or among the Columns in either place. Every Row sees the interests of other Rows
as ones she shares; the same is true for Columns.) Now suppose that both have agricultural economies and that their productive outputs depend on whether the Rows and Columns cooperate with each other. On both islands the islanders find themselves in a PD.
But, due entirely to geographical and climactic factors, the situations differ with respect
to how much food can be produced. Figures 7 and 8 lay out the differences:
Columns
cooperate

defect

cooperate

700, 700

25, 800

defect

800, 25

50, 50

Rows

Fig. 7. Island X’s agricultural production (in terms of bushels of wheat)
Columns
cooperate

defect

cooperate

100, 100

25, 2000

defect

2000, 25

50, 50

Rows

Fig. 8. Island Y’s agricultural production (in terms of bushels of wheat)
The inhabitants of both islands are in PDs. Both Island X and Island Y will be agriculturally much more productive if the islanders manage to avoid mutual defection. But note
that only on Island X will it be the case that the island as a whole is most productive if the
solution to the PD is mutual cooperation. Those living on Island Y are, through no fault
of their own, in circumstances where if one group defects while the other cooperates the
island as a whole will be collectively most productive. Put in the terms I have introduced,
those people living on Island X are in a PPD, but those on Island Y are in a DPD. Or, to
put it another way, while trying the idea of enslaving the other tribe is attractive to each
tribe on both islands, only on Island Y does slavery make the island as a whole more productive than it otherwise could be.8 Thus, given a few plausible assumptions about human
8

Though he does not put it in these terms, Sen (1999) points to evidence that this may have been the situation in the United States of America prior to its Civil War. The North was in circumstances like my Island X and the South in those like my Island Y.
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motivation, the tools needed to avoid slavery may well differ from island to island. Those
on Island X face a hard problem of how to avoid their collectively worst outcome—
which may well amount to a living that is near subsistence—and construct a mutually cooperative and collectively prosperous society. Those on Island Y face that same problem
plus the problem of how to avoid falling into being seduced into seeking great wealth for
some by means of repressing others. The problem might be even more serious in cases
where the payoffs to the two tribes are asymmetrical.
Thus, it might be the case that those on Island X could use morality alone to both
avoid mutual defection and ensure that both tribes are treated well in a system of fair mutual cooperation. If they understand their situation correctly they will see that mutual cooperation makes the both as members of their own tribe and as islanders better off. Indeed, as islanders they are collectively as well of as they can be. But for those on Island
Y—and this is just speculation on my part—morality may not be enough to have the two
tribes cooperate. Since the collectively best situation is where one tribe gets the other to
cooperate while it defects, it may be that a good dose of religion and superstition may be
needed to reach the same level of cooperation that those one Island X can attain without
these crutches. But note that if we just talk in terms of prisoners’ dilemmas we cannot
point to any difference between the two islands. Hence we have to assume their problems
are the same and, consequently, what served as a solution for one island would serve as a
solution for those on the other island. But, that may not be the case.
I do not mean to claim that DPDs necessarily require “stronger” measures to enable the participants to avoid sub-optimal outcomes. Let us turn to a more familiar case.
Anne and Andrew are married professionals and, like many of their neighbours and
friends, they have a young child. Each of them aspires both to be a good parent and to be
a success in their professional life. Let us suppose that being successful amounts to becoming a partner in the firm at which they are employed. “Making partner” requires
many long hours of hard work. Raising a child—at least in the social circumstances in
which Anne and Andrew find themselves—requires many hours of ferrying the child
from music lessons to ballet class to soccer practice to the orthodontist to second (and
third?) language classes to swimming lessons and so forth. Anne and Andrew each love
their child dearly and want all these things for her. But each would prefer that the other
do most of the child ferrying, while she or he just had, say, a special lunch out with the
child each weekend (both to bond with the child and to give the other parent some time
alone). Now it is possible that if they shared the childcare duties equally, each of them
would make partner but as both of them realize, this is extremely unlikely. Indeed, it is
only if one of them does most of the child-ferrying that one member of the couple (viz.,
the one who does not do much child-ferrying) make partner. Each prefers that she (or he)
be the one who makes partner while the other does most of the childrearing. But, loving
their daughter as they both do, they also prefer to share the childrearing rather than have
their lovely daughter not be properly taken care of. Further suppose that if each shares the
work of bringing up their child, they will each earn $100K, but that if one does the childrearing she will make only $50K, while the other (who then becomes a partner in the
firm) will earn $500K. If both ignore the child (that is, if they let her grow up with only
the level of attention that they each received from their parents), each will be so racked
by guilt that she (or he) will only earn $75K.
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Anne and Andrew are in a DPD. From the point of view of the household they
will earn the most money if one sacrifices her or his career so that the other will have a
better chance at success. And the child will—by their lights at least—be better off. With
$550K coming in the household can afford to have the pool heated with solar panels and
the swimming instructor come to their pool, to get new soccer shoes every month instead
of just each year, to have her learn both Spanish and Mandarin, and so forth.
Andrew
cooperate

defect

cooperate

$100K, $100K

$50K, $500K

defect

$500K, $50K

$75K, $75K

Anne

Fig. 8. Anne and Andrew try to make partner while being good partners.
Some aspects of this DPD are hard to resolve.9 But other aspects are (at least partially)
amenable to rather simple solutions (such as changes in divorce law and the introduction
of child-support rules). What is more difficult is to figure out not just how to protect the
partner who sacrifices her career success to her child’s success but how to organize our
society so that fewer couples are confronted with choices in such socially unwelcome and
unfriendly circumstances. Ideally, those couples raising children who find themselves in
situations of partial conflict should, so far as is possible, be in assurance games rather
than prisoners’ dilemmas. But, when we cannot figure out how to arrange society so that
they are in assurance games, we at least want them to be in productive PDs rather than
destructive ones. (Changing the tax structure or the pay system within partnerships so
$144,999 was the maximum possible level or earnings would change destructive PD
Anne and Andrew face into a productive one.)
Note that if we all adhere to the strictures of game theory—use only ordinal
preference rankings and never allow for interpersonal comparisons—the (relatively simple) problems I have outlined in this section do not even arise. To the contrary, they
would be completely invisible. Of course, many of the problems we collectively face are
much more complex. They will require all our resources both to properly represent them
and so that we can find the best arguments for how to solve such collective problems.
Game theory, combined with argumentation theory, offers a great deal of promise in this
area (see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984). But we need to find a way to be less
strict, without being lax, regarding what epistemic constraints we impose when representing such problems.
It is, of course, very difficult to make non-misleading generalizations about a
topic as complex as the trends in payoffs in strategic interactions among billions of humans. Whether we are entering a period during which collective cooperation on roughly
9

Here I think of the many non-obvious causes feminist research has uncovered for why it is so much
more likely that Andrew will be making partner while Anne is busy SUVing their child from one important “activity” to another and all the non-obvious ways in which this harms them both (Wein 2007c).
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fair terms is becoming easier to achieve or whether the benefits of exploitation and oppression will come to be even more attractive is immensely difficult to pin down. The
recent spectacular progress made by societies which until recently suffered from violence, oppression, and systemic lack of education gives grounds for hope. But the survival of slavery, and the recent signs of grown in the sex slave industry, is sad reminder that
creating societies that are cooperative ventures for mutual advantage for each is no easy
task. It will take a careful mix of our devices for fostering and sustaining cooperation to
enable us to create the sort of world where more of us live fulfilling lives. We need to understand the full nature of the problems we face if we are to enhance the probabilities of
hitting upon appropriate solutions.
7. CONCLUSION
Our world is becoming a safer and better one. But promoting and protecting the improvements that so many of us enjoy (and to which that so many more of us aspire) will
require careful use of our talents at constructing social arrangements which treat each of
us with the concern and respect that is appropriate. Game theory can play a role in helping us in these tasks. But we need to liberate it from some relics of its positivist past. As
Scott Shapiro has shown, humans sometimes need institutional and organizational plans
when they are confronted with moral problems whose solutions are contentious, complex,
or arbitrary (Shapiro, 2011). Shapiro’s primary concern is with showing how this way of
looking at things provides us with a firm foundation for a scientific sociology of legal
systems. He is only tangentially interested in which planning systems work best in which
circumstances. Yet one of the most difficult questions we confront in planning for planning is whether to use law or some other social device to solve the problem at hand. My
contention is that by removing some of the epistemic constraints on how we describe the
conflicts that our circumstances, combined with our rationality, produce, we will be better
able to use the powerful resources game theory provides to help us locate and describe
our problems so that we have a better chance of avoiding or removing them.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I thank Thea E. Smith for her help and the Dean of Arts at
Saint Mary's University for generous financial support.
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I am grateful to Sheldon Wein for confirming my suspicion that what is interesting about
the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), the stag hunt, and other game-theoretical scenarios is precisely what is left out of the more narrowly specialized discussions of such scenarios.
Now, it is not hard to understand what makes game theory such an attractive framework
for social analysis. There is much to admire in the simplicity and elegance of its formal
structures and it is easy to see how this reinforces the normative authority of whatever
outcomes they produce. The clarity of perspective game theory affords us is a commendable quality in an age of post-enlightened cultural immaturity and ethical confusion. The
conceptual content that is derived from constructive applications of PD may also provide
us with something a bit more coherent than any of the prevailing versions of the Western
evaluative consensus. However, what the non-specialist finds truly interesting about this
fairly limited expression of social rationality is the response to the creative pressure put
on the basic model by various components of its underlying normative infrastructure. In
my commentary, I will briefly discuss three of these components—the evaluative, the will
forming, and the socially integrative dimensions of rational choice—and in the process also
highlight what I take to be the most inciting parts of Wein’s paper. In so doing I also hope
to provide further support for Wein’s critique of the epistemic constraints that limit game
theoretical approaches to complex cases of action coordination or social conflict.
The first component concerns the evaluative dimension of assurance seeking and
cooperative action. Game theorists are right not to overburden their formal schemes with
the task of accounting for personal and interpersonal value preferences. They are also
correct to avoid ranking these preferences based on qualitative distinctions that assume
other, perhaps also questionable evaluative schemes. This is not the point of such limited
exercises in choice rationality and it is also not their strongest suit. To illustrate this, consider any PD-like situation in which two parties hold settled and transparent views on
what is worth sacrificing one’s life for. When they start thinking about their options and
considering their choices, they usually assume, rightly or wrongly, that they have enough
knowledge of the other party’s evaluative preferences and commitments to know what
that party is more likely to choose in an identical situation provided that she employs correct reasoning. And so, if the first party chooses, for instance, what she initially takes to
be the most advantageous option for both, and if this turns out to be based on wrong motivational and evaluative assumptions about what the other party actually chooses (say,
lone defection), the resultant choice would have to be characterized as an error in judgment. The error here would be caused by incorrect or incomplete information about the
other party’s initial orientation to value, or about her actual strength of will or, in some
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more complicated cases, about her true ability to reason consistently in accord with her
expressed orientation to value or her willpower.
Yet I wonder if this kind of explanation can account for the occurrence of such
errors in any except the most simplistic types of PD scenarios. Isn’t there more to such
scenarios than merely optimally selecting one from the several possible value-neutralized
outcomes? Aren’t we ignoring a more complex process of value-interpretation in which
one’s value orientation or preference is actually clarified by the choices one makes?
Doesn’t this also help to articulate the meaning of the value in question? And could it be
that values either acquire or enhance their normative force through such interpretations or
through deliberations over which outcome is more consistent with values that are implicit
in what one takes to be (in) one’s own interest? In many cases, it is this force itself that
turns values into effective grounds for action (thus enhancing their appeal). If so,
shouldn’t we focus less on the outcome of the deliberation in PD situations and more on
the evaluative aspects of such deliberations that help clarify the choice, identify its
grounds, and perhaps anticipate some of its effects on the complex web that ties together
individuals and groups in their world of shared and historically developed meaning? In
typical discussions of standard PD cases, the goal always seems to be to find ways of
getting out of a tight spot or reaping the highest reward in the most efficient way possible.
But many times the deliberation itself is an opportunity to test one’s allegiance to a value
or to norms that are allegedly derived from it. It is also a commitment to an interpretation
of value or to a possible way of applying a norm to a particular situation where other values are also involved. In many such cases, what appears to be an error of judgment in
standard discussions of PD is actually a form of evaluative error-reduction, as in finally
figuring out one’s values or one’s interpretation of value. Perhaps the lone defector in a
PD situation rather than cynically calculating what’s to her advantage is in fact experiencing an epiphany of sorts that endows her with greater moral insight.
This brings me to the second and closely related component, which is what social philosophers call the will-forming effect of practical judging in PD-like situations.
The will in question is both personal and interpersonal, that is, social or group-based, and
the will-forming dimension of rational choice can be explained along the following lines:
When agents make choices that are bound to have a considerable impact on their lives
and the lives of others, and when the possibility of error forces them to consider the complex structure of willing that is involved in such apparently simple decisions as choosing
one object over another (a structure that includes ends and means, values and duties, deliberation and action), they change in important ways. They acquire a clearer sense of
who they are not only in terms of the wider horizon of value that provides their choice with
meaning (as noted in my discussion of the first component), but also in terms of how this
choice impacts others, whose desires, expectations, sense of selfhood, etc. play an equally
important role in deliberation. When agents take these into account, the ‘we’ gradually replaces the ‘I’ and a we-attitude (as Raimo Tuomela calls it) supplants the initial I-attitude.
In this transition from a single perspective to a common perspective (or at least a more inclusive one), a new and different individual will emerges, as well as a collective one.
All this is rarely captured by the often simplistic and highly reductive conception
of agency that is used in game theory. Game-theoretical accounts derive their conception
of personhood from the notion of utility maximization, which means that the agent’s capacity for rationality is both established as well as exhausted by the act of choosing from
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different possible outcomes. Now, most choices people make and many of the PD-like
situations they find themselves thrown into have no transformative effects that would
lead to a qualitatively different will or to a we-attitude that could signal the presence of a
common will. In such situations, the notion of agency used by rational choice theorists
seems to be perfectly adequate. But the meaningful cases, the ones that are not reducible
to stochastic descriptions, are not of this type, and Wein in his paper gives us at least one
example of such a case, the example of the professional couple that must cooperate destructively in order to maximize the payoff for their entire family. This example contains
all the necessary elements for explaining the development of an individual’s will that is
not only practically mindful of others (or prudent) but also understands itself in terms of
others; that is, a will that coordinates with these others and subordinates its ends to those
acceptable to all. The example helps us explain the emergence of a common will through
attitudes of mutual acknowledgment. It also highlights the importance of shared values
that make sacrificing one’s private goals the only desirable and thus rationally acceptable
end. (The Hobbesian appeal to authority that Wein mentions in his paper could also be understood as an appeal to the implicit good that justifies the institution of monopolies on the
use of power.) Finally, the example captures what is essential about the creation of a collective self-image (“family values”) that can be culturally internalized and socially reproduced
through policies that aim at the public good and also help define what the public good is.
It is in this context that Wein’s distinction between productive and destructive
forms of PD shows its importance, and we realize this is as soon as we ask the following
question: destructive for whom? This distinction seems to capture the motivational gap
between the centripetal force of collective ends that pull individuals together and the centrifugal tendencies of pursuing private goals and desires. It may also signal the presence
of a conflict of values that fractures the common will between orientations to different
and perhaps incompatible goods. Whatever the case, this example presents us with an important instance of interpersonal will formation that goes beyond the contractualist or corporate conception of action coordination many rational choice theorists tend to assume. In
addition to this, it shows us how individual wills reemerge from a form of collective agency
that has lost its cohesion as a result of choices made outside the common value horizon.
The third component of the wider normative infrastructure that puts additional
pressure on the narrow deployment of strategic choice models to social analysis is revealed by the study of complex, large-scale action coordination that reduces choice to
performing predetermined functions within the various administrative systems of the
modern world. This operation of substitution effectively relegates personal interaction to
a species of structural or functional adjustment, and by ignoring the specific demands and
pressures of system integration game theory ends up as its first enabler. The distinction
productive-destructive PD effectively captures this reality. For what is destructive in the
example of the family that chooses strategically is precisely what is system-optimal on a
functionalist analysis of resource allocation.
Can one save rational choice from the destructive effects of system integration?
To answer this question, it may be worth recounting that Rousseau’s discussion of stag
hunting as a problem of action coordination belongs in a wider philosophical account of
social integration. Social integration or creating the general will, according to Rousseau,
can be achieved in one of the following two ways: by collectively pursuing the same object or by teaching individuals how to harmonize their interests and speak with a univer-
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sal voice. The first one requires the presence of assurance providing institutions of rule
enforcement, or authority. The second one demands the affirmation of a different kind of
social autonomy, or communicatively playing a re-assurance game. I am not sure if these
two are mutually exclusive. However, traditional game theory, as Wein presents it, seems
to favor something closer to the first strategy, which makes it difficult for it to explain
how choice disappears in the monotonous system manufacturing of social objects. The
alternative Wein himself seems to favor looks at choice in relation to a theory of social
rationalization that may indirectly rely on a conception of communicatively achieved
interpersonal harmonization. It would be interesting to know where exactly he stands on
this particular issue.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In “Productive versus Destructive Cooperation” I show that, simply by slightly enriching
the available information beyond that which contemporary game theory usually admits,
we can easily adopt standard game-theoretic models that will display in a concise and
comprehensive manner key features of the nature of some of our more pressing social
problems. Radu Neculau, in his insightful commentary, raises several difficult
philosophic questions about the basic assumptions on which contemporary game theory
(and the suggestions in “Constructive versus Destructive Cooperation”) rests. Since his
commentary is nicely organized around three topics, I will use his headings in my reflections.
I should note, however, that the concerns Neculau raises are serious and I cannot do them
justice here. Furthermore, even were we to conclude that the ground on which game theory
rests is faulty, this should not prevent us from making use of the devices game-theorists have
developed (and which I have suggested modifying) when such uses will help us easily
achieve a clearer understanding of how to deal with various social problems.
Perhaps this is an appropriate analogy. Suppose we were to find that the
philosophic objections to bi-valence were greater than the arguments in its defence. This
would certainly give many of us pause. But it would be no reason to abandon, say, truth
tables for those cases where they can elegantly illuminate the character of various logical
connectives. So, even were we to find the conception of rationality used by contemporary
decision theory to be in some respects inadequate, this should not keep us from
utilizing—at least in those circumstances where we can do so without
misrepresentation—the many ingenious models game-theorists have developed.
2. EVALUATION
In the course of refection on what we should do, given our values, we frequently come to
think we should change our values (or to realize that our values are not what we thought
they were). Can game theory help us evaluate our values? I think it is obvious that it can.
Sometimes one has what one wants. Other times to get what one wants one must
change things. Sometimes one has to change other parts of the world (perhaps including
other people and their desires and attitudes) to get what one wants. Still other times the
best part of the world to change is one’s own self—be it changing one’s conception of
rationality, or adopting new preferences, or altering one’s values. Game theory helps
people recognize when what they need to change is their circumstances or values or the
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values of others (or, as is most typical, all three) to increase the probabilities that our
actions will have outcomes that are Pareto-superior to the status quo. Knowing which sort
of situation we are in—whether we are in say a productive PD or a destructive PD or
some form of assurance game, to take the examples used in my paper—can help us
decide whether we should change our values and what social devices (a shared religion?
new morals? a renewed commitment to our tribe? team spirit? legal sanctions? or
etiquette?) we should use to reinforce and promote our newly acquired values. How good
is decision theory alone at helping people make collective decisions? Likely it is not very
good. (Try standing on a cold street corner with a group of decision theorists trying to
make a collective decision about which restaurant to go to—and whether to wait for X
before leaving for the restaurant—if you wish to confirm this!) Furthermore, decision
theory helps us see the ways in which such questions are empirical questions. An
example: Since developing team spirit is obviously a good way to ensure that everyone
cooperates in assurance games, one might think—as I confess I did—that having people
play team sports likely enhances moral development. But Catherine Hundleby pointed me
to Shannon Hogarth’s survey of research, which shows that my simplistic view was, well,
simplistic. Matters are much more complicated than I had supposed.
3. WILL FORMATION
How can those who adopt the minimalist account of rationality favoured by
contemporary decision theory ever hope to account for the fact that we humans are able
move from the “I-attitude” to the “we-attitude” (as Neculau so nicely puts it)? This is a
real difficulty, and my suggested modifications to what information decision theorists
should be allowed does not address this problem.
To see that it is a real problem one need look no further than the trouble Hobbes
has in this regard. Hobbes, who along with Descartes is making a radical break with the
scholastic tradition, defines the will by saying “In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or
Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call
the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing” (Leviathan, Chapter VI, § The Will). (He
goes on to observe that, given this view of individual wills, animals that deliberate must
be said to will. He objects to the scholastic view that the will is “Rationalle Appetite,”
observing that this makes voluntary action against reason impossible.) This account of the
will leads Hobbes to hold that “a Commonwealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes, but
those that are made by the Will of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power”
(Leviathan, Chapter XXXI, § All Attributes depend on the Lawes Civil). If this were the
best we could do to explicate (and justify) human capacities in this regard, we would face
the difficult choice of either abandoning our conception of rationality or holding that
many values we hold dear are chimerical.
Happily we can do better. Recently, Scott Shapiro—by combining insights from
H. L. A. Hart’s critique of Austinian/Hobbesian legal theory with Michael Bratman’s
work on planning and shared cooperative activities—has developed a promising account
of how rational authority could develop even given only a minimalist account of human
rationality. (Shapiro’s Legality is primarily concerned with explaining and justifying legal
authority—legal systems are, according to Shapiro, shared plans we use to solve moral
problems whose solutions are complex, contentious, or arbitrary—but the prospect of
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extensions to the we-attitude in other areas seems viable.) So we have the basis for seeing
how “a new and different individual will emerges, as well as a collective one”.
4. INTEGRATION
Neculau reminds us that social integration, the attainment of what Rousseau in his
brilliant and maddeningly elusive way called the general will, can be reached “by
collectively pursuing the same object or by teaching individuals how to harmonize their
interests and speak with a universal voice. The first one requires the presence of
assurance providing institutions of rule enforcement, or authority. The second one
demands the affirmation of a different kind of social autonomy, or communicatively
playing a re-assurance game.” Neculau asks where I stand on this matter.
This and related problems have long vexed me. In Wein 1987, I argued that even
pure altruists face prisoner’s dilemmas. (In effect, I was arguing that the second way is
not sufficient.) And in Wein 1997 I argued that, given recent changes in technology, the
first option was looking more like the second. More recently (Wein, 2007a), I argued
from a position that assumes the two ways of looking at these things may not be as
distinct as we usually suppose. In fact, it useful to remember that in the stag hunt story,
Rousseau actually has his hunters adopt a conception of rationality which is more
minimalist than even that Hobbes’s contractors have in the Leviathan. (For an argument
that Rousseau’s stag hunters have a conception of rationality closer to the minimalist
conception adopted by contemporary game theory, see Wein 2007b, and for an argument
that Hobbes’s agents are closer to embodying Rousseauian autonomy than is usually
supposed, see Venezia, forthcoming.) So, perhaps there is no answer to where I stand. It
might be better to say on this issue I am inclined to stagger!
5. CONCLUSION
The main point of “Productive versus Destructive Cooperation” is to show that, by
slightly enriching the standard strictures contemporary game theory adopts, we can easily
use some of its devices to more simply and accurately represent some of the problems we
solve. I do not claim that sophisticated game-theoretic accounts of the situations I discuss
can be provided. But I do think that such accounts will be so complex that my “less pure”
models will be more illuminating. Consider just one example. The government of Canada
has recently floated the idea of allowing couples to “income split” when calculating
taxes. This has been presented as a unifying and quasi-egalitarian idea, but, as the case of
Anne and Andrew shows, it would likely have the effect of preserving just those sorts of
“family values” most of us hope to undermine. Further use of enriched models of the type
I suggested could serve to make it easier for everyone to understand the nature of the
sorts of choices we face and, consequently, for more people to have informed input into
the conversation we need in order to make our society a genuine cooperative venture for
mutual advantage. Thus I continue to urge those who seek ways to represent the
circumstances in which our collective action problems arise to reconsider before blindly
accepting the severe epistemic constraints that decision theory endorses.
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